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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
GERALD JOHNSON, #80-B-0324,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2013-0006.03
INDEX # 2013-20
ORI #NY016015J

-againstANDREA W. EVANS, Chairwoman,
NYS Board of Parole,

Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Gerald Johnson, verified on December 31, 2012 and filed in
the Franklin County Clerk’s office on January 7, 2013. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the October 2011 determination denying
him parole and directing he be held for an additional 24 months. An Order to Show Cause
was issued on January 15, 2013. The Court has since received and reviewed respondent’s
Answer and Return, including in camera materials, verified on March 19, 2013 and
supported by the March 19, 2013 Letter Memorandum of Glen Francis Michaels, Esq.,
Assistant Attorney General in Charge. The Court has also received and reviewed
petitioner’s Reply thereto, dated April 4, 2011 and filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s
office on April 9, 2013.
On February 11, 2008 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, Erie County, to
concurrent indeterminate sentences of 25 years to life upon his convictions of two counts
of the crime of Murder 2°. Petitioner’s convictions/sentencings were affirmed on direct
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appeal to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department. See People v. Johnson, 89 AD2d
814.
Having been denied discretionary parole release on four previous occasions,
petitioner made his fifth appearance before a Parole Board on October 26, 2011.
Following that appearance a decision was rendered again denying petitioner parole and
directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The parole denial determination
read as follows:
“AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THE PANEL
HAS DETERMINED THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME, YOUR
RELEASE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF
SOCIETY AND WOULD SO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUS NATURE OF
THE CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR TEH [sic] LAW. THIS
DECISION IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: YOUR INSTANT
OFFENSE INVOLVED YOU AND YOUR CODEFENDANT SHOOTING A
61 YEAR OLD FEMALE VICTIM IN THE HEAD DURING THE COURSE
OF A ROBBERY.
THIS BRUTAL CRIME IS THE SEVERE ESCALATION OF YOUR PRIOR
THEFT RELATED OFFENSES. YOU HAVE DONE POORLY IN THE
PASSED UNDER COMMUNITY SUPERVISION. THE BOARD NOTES
YOUR PROGRAM, VOCATIONAL AND WORK ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
THE BOARD ALSO NOTES YOUR LETTER OF REASONABLE
ASSURANCE FROM CEPHAS HOUSE.
MORE COMPELLING, HOWEVER, IS THE EXTREME VIOLENCE
EXHIBITED IN THE I/O [Instant Offense], THE VULNERABILITY OF
THE VICTIM, AND YOUR CALLOUS DISREGARD FOR HER LIFE.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the October 2011
parole denial determination was received by the DOCCS Parole Appeals Unit on April 16,
2012.

Although the Appeals Unit apparently failed to issue its findings and

recommendation within the 4-month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c), a
belated decision on administrative appeal was, in fact, issued on or about November 13,
2012. This proceeding ensued.

2 of 7

[* 3]

Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
A significant portion of the petition is focused, in one way or another, on the
assertion that the parole denial determination was improperly based solely on the nature
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of the crime underlying petitioner’s incarceration, without adequate consideration of
other relevant statutory factors such as his vocational programing record, academic
achievements, clean disciplinary record since 2005 and release plans. A Parole Board,
however, need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider
in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to expressly
discuss each of those factors in its written decision. See Martin v. New York State
Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to
assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether
the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is
supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the record. Nor could we effectively
review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that
it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary
institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295,
1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, reviews of the Inmate Status Report and transcript of the Parole
Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it information with respect to the
appropriate statutory factors including petitioner’s therapeutic and vocational
programming records, clean disciplinary record since 2005, release plans and family
support in addition to the circumstances of the crimes underlying his incarceration and
prior criminal record. See Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. The Court, moreover, finds
nothing in the hearing transcript to suggest that the Board cut short petitioner’s
discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise prevented him from expressing clear and
complete responses to its inquiries. Indeed, just before the conclusion of his October 26,
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2011 Parole Board appearance petitioner was asked by a parole commissioner “[a]nything
else before we close, that I haven’t mentioned, that you’d like use to know?” At that point
the following colloquy occurred:
“A [Petitioner’s Answer]:

Well, I’d like - - you speak of this
crime that you mention that was
heinous, as you put it, and I
understand that, and I agree with
you 100 percent but, as I have
stated before, I had no
participation in that whatsoever.
I mean I ended up with some
property that belonged to the
victim, and that’s what started
this whole turn of events, as far
as I’m concerned, and - -

Q
[Parole Commissioner’s Question]:

So you admit that you did have
her property, but your position is
that you weren’t involved in the
robbery and burglary, correct?

A:

Absolutely not.

Q:

Okay. All right. Your position is
noted. You do understand that
as a Board, we can’t re-try the
case. We have to assume that the
jury’s decision is correct, unless a
court overturns or we hear
otherwise, but your position is
noted and you have been
consistent with that position
from the beginning, so we
understand that, sir.

A:

Okay. Thank you.”

In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the parole board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See McAllister v. New York State
Division of Parole 78 AD3d 1413, lv den 16 NY3d 707, and Davis v. Lemons, 73 AD3d
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1354. In addition, since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the
narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court
finds no basis to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by
irrationality bordering on impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on
the disturbing nature of the crime underlying petitioner’s incarceration as well as his prior
criminal record. See Gordon v. New York State Board of Parole, 81 AD3d 1032, Gonzalez
v. Chair, New York State Board of Parole, 72 AD3d 1368 and Marziale v. Alexander, 62
AD3d 1227.
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b,
effective October 1, 2011, to provide that the New York State Board of Parole shall
“ . . .establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law.
Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the
rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such
persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining
which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .” 1 Although petitioner asserts
that the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4) “ . . . directs the Board to focus
primarily on who the person appearing [before it] is today rather than who the person was
when the offense occurred,” he does not specifically challenge the implementation
procedures put into effect by the Board of Parole in response to the amendment to

1

Prior to the amendment the statute had provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall
“ . . .establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state
board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”
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Executive Law §259-c(4). Such issue, therefore, will not be addressed in this Decision and
Judgment.2
Finally, under the facts and circumstances of this case the Court finds no basis to
conclude that the parole denial determination usurped the authority of the judiciary by
effectively resentencing petitioner for his crimes. See Comfort v. New York State Division
of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, Smith v. New York State Division of Parole, 64 AD3d 1030 and
Marsh v. New York State Division of Parole, 31 AD3d 898.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

August 2, 2013 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice

2

It appears that petitioner is rescheduled to reappear before the Parole Board for discretionary
release consideration in November of 2013. W hile additional appellate-level clarification may come down
prior to petitioner’s reappearance, it should be noted that the Appellate Division, Third Department has
recently indicated that a risk and needs assessment instrument (such as COMPAS) must be utilized in
connection with post- September 30, 2011 discretionary parole release determinations (see Garfield v.
Evans, __ AD3d __, 2013 NY Slip Op 05029, July 3, 2013)
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